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This paper examines various strategies that have been
proposed for halting the recent drift toward protectionism and
restoring a more liberal trading regime. A number of groups and
individuals propose a multilateral approach aimed at immediately
reducing all forms of import barriers and export subsidies on a
nondiscriminatory basis across all commodities.Others, who
doubt that all major countries are prepared at this time to
pursue this approach, favor a bilateral and regional strategy in
which those countries willing to liberalize conclude agreements
that are left open for others to join.They believe that this
approach will eventually lead to multilateral liberalization.
Some groups believe that neither of these approaches will succeed
and that an aggressive stategy of quickly retaliating against the
unfair trade practices of other countries is the best way to
bring countries to the bargaining table for multilateral
negotiations.
The merits and problems of these various strategies are
considered as well as their prospects for implementation. The
importance of other conditions necesary for trade liberalization
such as satisfactory domestic and international macroeconomic
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All the major trading blocs have expressed dissatisfaction
with the iiliberality of the present internationaltrading
system. The United States complains that most other nations have
failed to open their markets to the extent it has and thatmany
nations artificially promote exports to the United Statesby
unfair subsidization and dumping. Members of the European
Community contend they are unable to penetrate the markets of
Japan and many developin6j countries because of protectionist
policies while at the same time Europe is being flooded with
exports of manufactured goods from these same countries. In
response, Japan maintains that its competitive ability is based
on free market forces and that, with few exceptions, its markets
are as open as those of other major industrial nations. The
smaller industrial nations also complain about the lack ofopen
markets in many countries, and the land-abundant members of this
grnup join the United States in strongly protesting the
protection given agriculture in the European Community and Japan.
The developing countries object to the high barriers erected in
the industrial nations against such labor-intensive manufactured
goods as textiles and to the high effective rates of protection
1on many processed natural resource products.
This dissatisfaction with the existing trading system has
led to a number of proposals for halting the protectionist trend
of recent years and restoring a more liberal international
trading regime.The proposals differ in three major ways: (I)
the economic, political, and social factors deemed important in
analyzing the prospects of greater liberalization; (ii) the
degree of liberalization which their proponents seek; and (iii)
the extent to which they address the alleged causes of breakdown
of the postwar liberal trading order.It is the purpose of this
paper to analyze and evaluate a selected number of these
proposals.
The first section of the paper considers two broad analyses
oftrading regimesthat emphasize differentfactors in
understanding the prospects for a return to a more liberal
trading order: one stresses the economic power relationships
among trading nations and the second stresses the legal framework
in which trade and other economic institutions operate. Section
two discusses the importance of satisfactory domestic and
international macroeconomic conditions and• the next three
sections focus on alternative trade policy strategies for moving
toward a more liberal trading regime.Section three analyzes
proposals for utilizing a multilateral approach, and section four
sets forth the arguments for proceeding on a bilateral and
regional basis toward more open trade. The fifth section
considers a trade strategy of aggressive retaliation with
2discriminatory taxes and subsidies to force certain countries to
abandon their beggar—thy-neighbor policies and accept a liberal
multilateral trading order. The sixth section evaluates the
three approaches by considering the likelihood of their being
implemented and the extent to which, if adopted, they will serve
to move the trading community toward multilateral liberalization.
The last section puts forth another alternative, namely, holding
a negotiation on subsidies and other unfair trade practices, for
halting the spread of protectionism and setting the stage for
multilateral liberalization.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POWER, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
TRADE POLICYMAKING, AND THE LIBERAL TRADING ORDER
According to the theory of hegemonic stability associated
with such writers as Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1975), and
Krasner (1976), when a nation emerges as the dominant and most
economically efficient world poweras did the United Kingdom in
the 19th century and the United States in the years following
World War II -thatnation finds it in its economic and political
interests to promote the collective good of global stability
through a liberal international trading and monetary regime.
When thehegemonbegins to lose its dominant position, however-
as the United States has since the mid-1960s -thefree rides
given to smaller states by the hegemonts liberal trade policy,
coupled with the most—favored-nation principle that this policy
involves, are no longer politically tolerable to domestic
3economic interests.Consequently, the early versions of this
theory predicted the inevitable collapse of the liberal postwar
trading regime and a return to general protectionism.
When the dire initial predictions of the formulators of the
hegemonic explanation of regime change failed to materialize,
modifications in the theory appeared. Keohane (1984) argues, for
example,that independent states have complementary self-
interests that enable cooperation to take place within a
nonhegemonic environment.Moreover, international institutions
such as the GATT facilitate such cooperation.In his view, we
are now in a period of transition between the hegemonic
cooperation of the postwar period and a new state of affairs
characterized either by the current discord or by post-hegemonic
cooperation.Whether discord or cooperation prevails in trade
matters depends, according to Keohane, on how well governments
take advantage of existing international institutions to make new
agreements on trade matters and to ensure compliance with old
ones. He points to the Muitifiber Arrangement, however, as
evidence that the cooperative approach does not necessarily imply
the choice of liberal trade policies.
The late Jan Tumlir also viewed the problem of achieving
greater trade liberalization in broad political and legal terms.
According to Tumlir (1984), the disintegration of the postwar
liberal trading regimeisdue to legislatures'improper
delegation of power to the executive branch of government,
coupled with the lack of either international or domestic legal
4cont:rol overthe executive's international economic policies.
Tumlir criticizes the diplomatic authors of the GATT on the
grounds they misstated the case for a liberal trade regime by
emphasizing that the benefits would stem from the "concessions"
of other countries rather than from the efficiency effects of
lower import prices and they conceived of the GATT as a universal
organization in which the wishes of all members should be
satisfied.In Tumlir's view, the constant negotiation required
to keep members satisfied has eroded the basic rules of the
organization.
While Tumlir was pessimistic about the prospect of returning
to a truly liberal international trading order, he observed some
offsetting tendencies to the excessive delegation of power to the
executive branch, for example, the increasing use by private
individuals of the courts to complain of the arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of trade—regulatory powers delegated to
national executives. He welcomed the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in the Chadha case which declared the legislative veto
to be inconsistent with the constitutional division of powers
between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
government, seeing it as a step that will force Congress to be
more careful when it delegates powers to the executive branch.
II. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND LIBERALIZATION
While policy-oriented economists recognize the importance of
the political and legal foundations of an international economic
5regime, most believe that it is possible to make a significant
move toward a more liberal international trading order through
practicable changes in existing economic institutions and
policies.However, many economists, such as Bhagwati (1983),
Bergsten (1984), Donges (1984), Hufbauer and Schott (1985), and
AhoandAronson (1985) argue that this effort must involve much
more than simply changes in the trade area. Because of the
increasing interdependence of the world economy, the prospects
for reducing protectionism depend not only on satisfactory
international monetary and capital—transfer conditions but on
domestic monetary, fiscal and regulatory conditions within the
major trading nations.
Current protectionist pressures in the United States
highlight the importance of understanding the interrelationships
between domestic macroeconomic policies and trade policy.The
huge U.S. trade deficit, which reached $140 billion in 1985, has
sparked the introduction of some 200 trade bills in the U.S.
Congress, most of which their sponsors justify on the grounds
that they will help reduce this deficit. The Trade Emergency and
Export Promotion Act, introduced by Congressman Richard Gephardt
and Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, who chairs the Ways and Means
Committee which is the key House committee dealing with trade
legislation, typifies these bills.The purpose of the measure,
according to its authors, is to "reverse the enormous shortfafl
in our balance of trade,'t which they attribute to "1) the
overvalued U.S. dollar,2) the persistent growth of foreign
6unfair trade barriers, and 3) the lack of a coherent U.S. trade
policy" (Rostenkowski and Gephardt, 1985). The bill mandates the
imposition of a 2596 duty on any major U.S. trading partner
(defined as a country that has over $7 billion in annual trade
with the United States) whose exports to the United States exceed
its imports from the United States by 6596 or its exports to the
world exceeded its imports from the world by 5096, excluding oil
trade.The Senate version of the bill also requires the U.S.
Trade Representative to apply countersubsidies on exports of
agricultural products when other countries are subsidizing their
agricultural exports.
Unfortunately, the Congressmen's explanation of the causes
of the U.S. trade deficit is incomplete and flawed.What is
worse, there is no reason to expect that the import—restricting
and export-promoting actions mandated in the bill would reduce
the U.S. trade deficit. As economists have been pointing out for
many years, trade deficits or surpluses are largely determined by
macroeconomic conditions. The difference between a country's
total exports and imports of goods and services represents its
foreign investment which, together with domestic investment,
equals its aggregate investment.Aggregate investment is, in
turn, by definition equal to aggregate saving, which is composed
of private saving plus the difference between government taxes
and government expenditures, in other words, government saving.
The U.S. trade deficit has its roots in a significant fall in
aggregate saving brought about by the increase in federal
7government expenditures relative to tax collections. Since
private saving has not increased to offset this decline in
government saving, the effect of the increased government
expenditures must be to crowd out either domestic investment or
net foreign investment. The rise of interest rates as the
government has bid for funds to finance its deficit in an
environment of tight monetary policy has not only tended to
discourage private investment but has led to a return of U.S.
funds previously invested abroad and an inflow of foreign
capital. Consequently,thetrade balancehasturned
significantly negative and the value of the dollar has risen
substantially compared to the late 1970s as the international
demand for dollars has increased.Fortunately, within the last
year the dollar has depreciated significantly, a development that
is likely to reduce the pressures for protectionism considerably
once its trade—balance effects occur.
Unfair trade practices and the lack of a coherent U.S. trade
policy have had only a minimal effect on the U.S. trade balance,
since they have little effect on aggregate savings or investment.
Unfair trade practices can, of course, cause trade-balance
deficits in particular product sectors.But under a flexible
exchange rate system, these deficits lead toa marginal
depreciation of the dollar and thus offsetting marginal increases
in exports and decreases in imports in other sectors.
Similarly,theimport surcharges required under the
Rostenkowski-Gephardt bill are unlikely to have an appreciable
8effect on the U.S. trade balance. The increased profits and thus
saving byimport—competing industries which benefit from
protection will tend to be offset by lower profits and saving in
export sectors that are harmed by the protection. Furthermore,
most estimates of the revenue implications of proposals for
import surcharges conclude that any favorable balance—of-trade
effects will be offset by a further appreciation of the dollar.
Retaliatory actions by other countries would also make the
deficit problem worse.
While the U.S. domestic policies that have brought about the
t:radedeficit have benefited export industries in other
countries, the outflow of capital from these countries represents
funds that might otherwise have gone for domestic investment
purposes. Furthermore, the high level of U.S. interest rates has
forced other countries to maintain higher interest rates than
they desire in order to control the capital outflow.This has
depressed investment in such sectors as construction and thereby
further exacerbated their unemployment problem. In Europe and
other areas where unemployment is a serious problem, it seems
clearthat better employment conditions •are a political
prerequisite to any significant trade liberalization.
A number of economists, besides emphasizing the need for the
better international coordination of domestic policies as part of
a strategy for significant trade liberalization, also argue that
trade—liberalizing efforts must be linked to international
monetary reform,aimed atlimiting the risk of severe
9misalignment of the exchange rates of the major countries,
reducing the volatility of these rates, and at achieving a long-
run solution to the debt problem of many developing countries.
They welcome the recent successfully coordinated efforts of the
major trading nations to bring down the value of the dollar and
reduce interest rates,butthey advocate moreformal
arrangements. Bhagwati (1983) and others also believe that
liberalization by the developing countries is unlikely unless
larger financial resources are made available to them to ease
their short—run debt repayment pressures. Some suggest tying at
least part of this increased financial assistance to trade—
liberalizing actions by the recipients.
III. THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Proponents of the multilateral approach to liberalization,
including such recent articulators of this position as the GATT
"Wisemen's" Group (1985), the Scott Study Group of the Trade
Policy Research Centre (1984), Curzon and Price (1985), Aho and
Aronson (1985), Donges (1984), and Preeg (1985), believe that
reductions in all forms of import barriers and export subsidies
on a nondiscriminatory basis across all commodities will create
the most favorable conditions for high, sustained rates of income
and employment growth throughout the world economy and for
harmonious political relations among nations.They view the
increased use of trade—distorting measures in recent years as a
regrettable consequence of governments' unwise macroeconomic
10policies and reacting to political pressures from particular
economically inefficient industries, and they maintain that only
through a politically bold program of significant liberalization
in all trading sectors can the present creeping protectionism be
reversed. Most advocates of this approach favor certain
institutional and policy changes to facilitate the liberalization
process and prevent the recurrence of protectionism.
Elimination of the use of voluntary export restraint
agreements (VERs) and orderly marketing agreements (OMAs) is high
on the agenda of proponents of multilateral liberalization.
These measures to protect domestic industries from injurious
import competition are condemned because they curtail trade on a
selective country basis and they involve the use of quantitative
restrictions. Advocates of multilateral liberalism would require
all safeguard actions to be brought within the most-favored-
nation framework of the GATT. Most also argue that the
protection granted under such actions should only be in the form
of tariffs, and any tariff increases should be temporary and
degressive.
Thereis,however,a general recognition that some
modifications in safeguard procedures are needed to moderate the
pressure to resort to selective protection. There is widespread
agreement on no longer requiring the country that increases
protection under GATT safeguard provisions to compensate other
countries with cuts in duties on other products, provided the
protection is temporary and degressive.Retaliation would also
11be ruled out in these circumstances.
More effective measures to facilitate the adjustment of
workers and capital owners in import—injured industries are also
advocated to ease the pressures for selective protection.At
present,only the United States and Canada have special
assistance programs specifically aimedatimport-injured
industries, and recently a number of writers, such as Hufbauer
and Rosen (1986), Mutti (1985), Schultz and Schumacher (1984),
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makingthese more effective.A novel feature of some of these
proposals is that the adjustment assistance to workers would be
financed by converting existing quotas to tariffs or by
auctioning off the quotas. To overcome the criticism that
additional unemployment payments encourage displaced workers to
remain unemployed for longer periods, Mutti (1985) and Lawrence
and Litan(1986)propose that,in addition to extended
unemployment insurance payments and job retraining programs,
workers be given the incentive to take new jobs by partially
compensating them if their earnings are lower in their new
employment.The Reagan Administration proposed in 1984 that
displaced workers be given wage vouchers that would enable
employers who hired them to claim a direct cash subsidy for a
specified percentage of the wages paid the workers. While more
evidenceis needed to reach a firm conclusion on the
effectiveness of this approach, one American experiment with wage
vouchers proved very disappointing (see Burtless, 1985). In
12addition to speciai assistance to workers displaced by import
competition, most proposals also include provisions, such as
relaxed merger standards, to encourage the restructuring of the
injured industry to enable it to become more efficient.
Supporters of multilateral liberalization regard the highly
protected textile and apparel sector as a prime candidate for
structural adjustment. They would use the occasion of the
expiration of the Multifiber Arrangement III in 1986 to set in
place the procedures for bringing this industry back within
normal GATT rules. World steel trade, which is becoming
increasingly subject to discriminatory quantitative restrictions,
would be liberalized.Agriculture also stands out as a sector
where both domestic and international measures distort world
trade to a significant degree, and advocates of general
liberalization would progessively enlarge the scope for the
interplay of market forces in trade in agriculture. An initial
step would be to extend the GATT ban on export subsidies to
agricultural products.
Those who advocate a return to stricter enforcement of the
unconditional most—favored—nation principle have some
disagreement on the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The
GATT Wisemen's Group and the Scott Group believe that these
tariff preferences have been of limited value to developing
countries and, indeed, have acted to divert the efforts of these
countries from reciprocal negotiations that would have yielded
them greater benefits.Others, such as Preeg, are willing to
13"graduate" the more advanced developing nations from tariff
preference and other forms of special and differential treatment
hut are reluctant to eliminate such treatment entirely.
There seems little doubt that a return to multilateral
liberalization cannot be effective without greater international
consensus on the appropriate use of domestic subsidies.Most
U.S. officials and business leaders believe, for example, that
many countries are unfairly subsidizing their industrial
production, thereby causing disruptive import surges in U.S.
markets. In response, these countries claim they are using
domestic aids for legitimate development or adjustment purposes.
The new Subsidies Code negotiated in the Tokyo Round is
considered by many to be too general to be of much use in
settling disputes that arise on this issue.Complaining about
the subsidizing actions of other countries, the U.S. points to
the part of the Code in which signatories agree to seek to avoid
the use of subsidies that "may cause or threaten to cause injury
to a domestic industry of another signatory or seriously
prejudice the interests of another signatory or may nullify or
impair benefits accruing to another signatory under the General
Agreement." Other nations, in support of the use of subsidies,
point to the following statement in the Code: "Signatories
recognize that subsidies other than export subsidies are widely
used as important instruments for the promotion of social and
economic policy objectives and do not intend to restrict the
right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and
14other important policy objectives which they consider desirable."
As the GATT Wisemen's Group pointed out, there is a pressing need
for revision and clarification of the GATT rules on subsidies.
Besides calling for a strengthening of the subsidies code
and other codes negotiated in the Tokyo Round, proponents of a
revitalized multilateral approach to liberalization press for
various institutional reforms in the GATT. Improved dispute
settlement procedures stand high on their list of needed reforms.
To replace the current practice of giving preference to
government officials as members of dispute settlement panels, it
has been proposed that members be drawn from a small list of non-
governmental experts who over time would be able to develop a
harmonious body of case law covering various types of disputes.
It has also been proposed that the countries involved in a
dispute no longer have the right to veto the acceptance of a
panel report by the members as a whole.In addition, speedier
and more detailed reporting procedures have often been called for
as a means of increasing confidence in this method of settling
trade disputes.
Granting greater authority to the Director—General is
frequently proposed for a better-functioning GATT. For example,
the GATT Secretariat might be given the authority to collect
information on the extent of protection, monitor trade policies
for possible violations of GATT rules, and enter the negotiations
over disputes at an early stage.
In addition to strengthening existing GATT rules, those
15pressing for a return to a more liberal multilateral approach
generally favor broadening the scope of trade covered by GATT
rules.Services trade is the most frequently mentioned area for
'the extension of GATT rules, but trade in intellectual property
and high technology items and trade—related investment issues are
other fields proposed for greater coverage by GATT. The
objective would be to reduce the use of many trade—distorting
practices that have arisen in these areas and thereby widen the
support for liberalization. Negotiating new codes of good
conduct, as was done in the Tokyo Round for subsidies and
government procurement policies, is the most frequently suggested
technique for dealing with these subjects.
IV. THE BILATERAL AND REGIONAL APPROACH TO LIBERALIZATION
Some observers of the trade policy scene, such as Hufbauer
(1984) and Hufbauer and Schott (1985), believe that the
multilateral approach would have little impacton the deeply
embedded distortions existing in the present world trading
system.In their view, bilateral and pluriJ.ateral. initiatives
should be welcomed on the grounds that they will eventually
mature into multilateral liberalization. Aho and Aronson (1985)
and others favor efforts to liberalize on a multilateral basis
but are prepared to fall back to a bilateral and regional
approach if multilateralism fails.
All recognize that there has been a significant increase in
bilateralism and regionalism over the last forty years. The most
16important regional trading organization is, of course, the
European Community (EC). Starting out with six member countries
in 1957, it now includes, with the recent admission to membership
of Portugal and Spain, twelve countries. Moreover, the Community
has negotiated special free trade arrangements with members of
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and with the former African,
Caribbean, and Pacific colonies of Community members.Various
free trade groupings of developing countries, such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Latin
American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), have also been formed.
Recently the United States has also moved in this direction with
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the free trade arrangement with
Israel, and the launching of negotiations aimed at a free trade
agreement with Canada, as have Australia and New Zealand with
their Closer Economic Relations Agreement.The extension of
tariff preferences to the developing countries by the industrial
countries and the negotiation of nontariff trade barrier (NTB)
codes during the Tokyo Round that apply only to those members
that sign them are other illustrations of the abandonment of the
multilateral approach in dealing with trade isèues.
Advocates of the bilateral and regional approach, either as
a first-best or second—best means of achieving liberalization,
would build upon previous uses of this technique. For example,
given the strong opposition of some countries to the inclusion of
such issues as services trade and trade—related investment
requirements on the agenda of the next GATT round, they suggest
17seeking selective agreements such as the Tokyo Round NTB codes
or, if this path is blocked, negotiating bilaterally on these
matters, using the threat of selective retaliation under national
laws to bring about such negotiations. Agreements reached would
be open-ended in the sense that any country would gain the trade
benefits of the liberalization which reduced its own barriers.
The hope is that, as these benefits increase with increasing
membership in an agreement, those reluctant to participate would
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eventuallyis multilateralized.Even if this does not come
about, the proponents of the regional approach maintain that it
would produce greater liberalization than would efforts to pursue
multilateral liberalization directly.
V. THE AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO LIBERALIZATION
Criticsofthebilateraland regionalapproachto
liberalization fear that it encourages further breakdowns in the
multilateral system and the politicization of world trade.
Citing, for example, the resistance of the developing countries
to multilateral tariff reductions that gradually erode the
diversionary value of their tariff preferences, they point out
that vested interests quickly emerge to protect the economic
inefficiencies implicit in bilateral and regional arrangements,
making it difficult to turn such agreements into liberal
multilateral arrangements.They further argue that some of the
countries taking advantage of the present lack of reciprocity in
18t:he trading system will choose to remain outside of bilateral and
regional agreements that require them to open their markets to a
greater extent.
An aggressive approach to liberalization is therefore
proposed, and Democratic and Republican leaders in the U.S.
Congress are its most vocal proponents, as Ahearn and Reifman
(1986) point out.The Rostenkowski-Gephardt bill outlined in
Section II illustrates this aggressive approach.Congressional
leaders and, in fact, most members of Congress, believe that the
only way to restore open markets is, first,to threaten
retaliation against countries that do not provide access to their
markets that is substantially equivalent to that offered by the
United States, and then to carry through with the retaliation if
they do not respond in an appropriate manner.The retaliation
would take the form of discriminatory increases in U.S.
protection.
The existence of a substantial trade deficit with another
country or the failure of exports and imports to grow at
approximately the same rate from a particular base period is
regarded as sufficient evidence that the other country is not
providing equivalent market access. As Cline (1983) points out,
this new notion of reciprocity is unilateral in nature and means
scrapping trade commitments agreed on in previous negotiations.
Another important element in the aggressive approach to
liberalization is vigorous retaliation against unfair trade
practices.For example, although GATT rules do not presently
19regard subsidizing agricultural exports as unfair, most members
of Congress favor matching the EC's subsidies of agricultural
exports with subsidies for U.S. agricultural products.Various
forms of assistance to domestic sectors such as subsidies to high
tech industries or financial aid to depressed firms would be met
either by equivalent subsidies to U.S. manufacturers of the same
goods or by discriminatory protection that denies U.S. markets
for the products of these sectors.
The premise behind the aggressive approach to liberalization
is that making it impossible for countries to increase their
export markets by engaging in unfair trade practices will
eventually eliminate such "beggar—thy-neighbor" activities, since
the instigators will have nothing to gain by these actions. At
that point, each country will come to see that only through a
policy of open and reciprocal trade is it possible to obtain the
income and employment benefits of trade. Defenders of the
aggressive approach maintain that the enforcement of current GATT
rules is now so lax and the rules so vague that it pays some
countries to try to avoid granting full reciprocity and to
undertake unfair trade practices.
VI. AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LIBERALIZATION
The majority of economists in the industrialized nations and
many economists in the developing countries strongly favor
significant trade liberalization on a multilateral basis. In
their view, historical experience and economic analysis clearly
20indicate that multilateral liberalization promotes world economic
prosperity and growth whereas restrictionism is associated with
sluggish economic performance and periodic balance-of--payments
crises. How then do we explain the existence of so much
protectionism and discrimination?
Economists frequently attribute it to the lack of political
will on the part of governments.The implication is that while
governments may know that liberal trade policies are best for
promoting long-run economic welfare, they lack the resolve to
forego the political support of narrow special interest groups
who may lose in the short run from liberalization.Although
there is merit in this explanation, the matter appears to be
considerably more complex than "lack of political will" suggests.
This explanation is also usually put forth with a finality that
discourages further research into the process of political
decision making and it may delude economists into believing the
solution to thwarting protectionism is easier than is in fact the
case.On the basis of the political-will hypothesis, one tends
to conclude that greater efforts to educate public officials and
the public generally on the advantages of liberal trade policies
are the best way to restore multilateral liberalism.However,
empirical work in the area of the political economy of trade
policy, such as that of Cheh (1974), Caves (1976), Lavergne
(1983), Baldwin (1985), and Anderson and Baldwin (1986), supports
the view that public officials support protectionism not only
because of political pressures from special groups but also out
21of concern for equity and the adjustment problems workers face as
a result of industry—injuring shocks, perceived unfair trade
practices by other countries, and the need to maintain a strong
domestic industrial base. Consequently, to better understand how
liberal trade policies can be implemented, economists must
analyze the economic and political forces that shape the
pressures for protectionism.
The protectionism currently threatening the international
trading regime has its roots in the significant structural
changes in world production that have brought about a decline in
the dominant economic position of the United States,a
concomitant rise of the European Community and Japan to
international economic prominence, and the emergence of a highly
competitive group of newly industrializing countries. After
World War II the trading regime expected to develop involved a
sharing of responsibility by the major economic powers for
maintaining open and stable trading conditions.However, the
unexpected magnitude of the immediate postwar economic and
political problems thrust the United States into a hegemonic
role.U.S. economic dominance manifested itself in the trade,
finance, and energy fields, and enabled American producers to
establish predominant export and investment positions abroad.
Then by facilitating the reconstruction and development of
Western Europe and Japan and the industrialization of some of the
developing countries, U.S. hegemonic activities led eventually to
a marked decline in the American share of world exports and a
22significant rise of import competition in both labor—intensive
sectors and certain o]igopolistically organized industries.
These developments also significantly diminished the leadership
authority of the United States.
Most governments in Western Europe responded to the shifts
in comparative advantage by providing injured manufacturing
industries with subsidies and injured agricultural sectors with
greater import protection and export subsidies.Such behavior
was consistent with the active role played by the governments of
these countries in promoting reconstruction and development.
For the United States, where intervention to assist injured
industries was not accepted government policy, the adjustment
process has been difficult.When the pressures for adjustment
first became noticeable in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was
thought they could be handled by pressing for greater
liberalization to reduce the trade—diversionary impact of the
formation of the European Community and also to open markets in
Japan and the developing countries. After this proved, however,
to provide no more than temporary relief from the need for major
restructuring, and especially after U.S. macroeconomic policies
led to a substantial appreciation of the dollar,government,
business, labor, and agricultural leaders began to adopt the now-
prevalent view that unfair trade practices are a major cause of
U.S. competitive problems.By urging more vigorous enforcement
of U.S. statutes and GATT rules on unfair trade, they are able to
press for import protection and still claim support for the open
23trading regime theUnitedStates did much to establish after
World War II.It is clear, however, that the U.S. government is
riot now prepared to begin the process of dismantling protection
in such key sectors as textiles and apparel or in steel.There
is pressure for reform in agriculture but this is an export
sector for the United States.It is not even evident what the
U.S. position on selectivity will be.
Nor can much in the way of real pressure for multilateral
liberalization be expected from the Community. Most members face
severe structural adjustment and unemployment problems, and a
strong ideological commitment to free market policies is lacking
in all but a few countries.This means that chances are very
slim that the Community will agree to significant changes in the
GATT rules on agriculture. Reductions in Community subsidies for
depressed industries and for the development of high tech sectors
also appear unlikely in the foreseeable future.
The way the Community is organized works against the
development of any major initiative on liberalization. Although
its members negotiate as a group through the European Economic
Commission, the real power remains in the hands of the individual
states, any one of which can block major change in trade policy.
Given the highly divergent political, social, and economic
conditions of the member countries, particularly with the
addition of Greece and now Portugal and Spain, it is almost
impossible for the Community to take the lead in restoring
multilateral liberalism or, indeed, to support this initiative.
24Japan is ]ikely to support significant liberalization but
not to initiate a move in this direction. Like the United States
in the 1920s, it is performing as a major trading power on the
export side but not on the import side.Conventional barriers
appear reasonably low, but the existence of large companies that
cover a wide variety of industries and the tradition of consumer
loyalty to these companies make it difficult to break into the
Japanese industrial market.Attitudes of "Buy Japanese' that
stem from efforts of this natural resource—poor country to become
a major industrial power,an apparent aversion to unfamiliar
products, especially foreign goods, and language and cultural
differences further contribute to the difficulty in penetrating
Japan's markets for manufactured goods.Thus, it is not clear
that traditional liberalization measures will, in fact, do much
to open Japanese markets.
The developing countries are still unwilling to undertake
significant liberalization themselves. They are likely to
continue to push for further "special and differential treatment"
from the developed countries rather than for major liberalization
actions by them. The strong opposition of the developing nations
to efforts to liberalize trade in services or reduce trade-
related investment requirements will also limit the scope of any
agreements on these issues in the next GATT negotiating round.
These positions of the major trading blocs make it unlikely
that we will see significant liberalization in the foreseeable
future.To expect that, under present international economic
25relationships, countries will somehow find the "political will"
to undertake this action seems to be wishful thinking.Another
round of GATT trade negotiations is likely to begin shortly, but
other than extending GATT rules to services trade, counter-
feiting, and intellectual property and introducing some changes
in the dispute settlement procedures, the main benefit from the
negotiations may be simply to hold back further protectionism.
At the same time GATT-sponsored multilateral negotiations
are proceeding, there are likely to be additional bilateral and
regional agreements negotiated.The greater use of bilateral
negotiation to settle disputes seems to be a positive step in
maintaining an open and fair trading system.The GATT dispute-
settlement procedures have proved too cumbersome for dealing with
the dozens of disputes on nontariff issues that exist at any one
time and mainly concern only a few countries. Some countries seem
to take advantage of this fact by engaging in clearly unfair
trade practices in the hope that the injured countries will be
discouraged from utilizing GATT dispute-settlement procedures
because of their time-consuming and costly nature. Responding on
a bilateral level to such actions and threatening retaliation
unless the dispute is settled quickly has proved a useful way to
deal with this problem.
In contrast,the efficacy of bilateral and regional
agreements as a means of promoting greater liberalization is more
problematical.In my view, these are not to be welcomed as a
step toward multilateral liberalization.The motivation for
26bilateral or regional agreements is usually not to achieve mutual
economic gains through liberalization but to strengthen political
ties through greater trade.It is a way for nations to band
together to achieve greater collective political and economic
power.There seems to be a strong desire to expand the size of
regional groupings in order to display greater political and
economic strength vis—à—vis other large economic powers, but
there is resistance to merging the major groupings to achieve
multilateral liberalization because this would undermine the
political identities that are the reason for the creation of the
trading blocs.Thus, in the end these agreements may act as a
barrier to multilateral liberalization.
Pursuit of the aggressive trade policy approach also
involves considerable risk for achieving an open trading system.
This is most apparent in attempts of the large trading blocs to
effect change in each others' behavior by threatened retaliation.
To make a threat of retaliation credible, it is usually necessary
to publicize the alleged unfairness of the other's actions.In
turn, the other trading power tends to publicize the threatened
action and its unfairness to deter the retaliation.Typically,
the news media tend to give wide and sympathetic circulation to
their own country's national viewpoint and the dispute quickly
becomes a matter of national pride. It then is politically very
difficult for the government of a major trading power to accept
retaliation and discontinue the practices that provoked it.
Counter-retaliation is the most likely response. While a
27retaliatory war may not necessarily result, the outcome is almost
surely not greater liberalization; an equilibrium with greater
distortion of world trade is more likely.
The retaliatory approach may be effective for a large
trading power when it is used against a small country. A small
country is generally unable to cause economic injury by
retaliating against a large trading nation, hut can be badly hurt
itself by aggressive actions by the large power. The difficulty
with such aggressive action is that, while it may force a small
country to stop certain practices, it is at the cost of worsening
political relations with the small countries that see it as
exploitation.Large countries are often reluctant to pay this
political price since they rely on the support of small countries
in their power struggle against other large powers.
VI. A NEGOTIATION ON SUBSIDIES AND OTHER UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
The preceding evaluation of the main proposals for achieving
multilateral liberalization leads one to conclude that the most
likely scenario for the rest of the 1980s is a continued drift
toward further distortions of world trade and greater use of
discriminatory measures.The main reason for this pessimism is
that the United States the traditional leader of the push for
multilaerdl trade liberalization —-isin danger of abandoning
this role and concentrating on bilateral and plurilateral
agreements coupled with an aggressive trade policy stance toward
outsiders.Given the unlikelihood that the European Community,
28Japan,or the developing countries will provide any real
leadership for multilateral liberalization, thetradingworld
will most likely be divided into large trading blocs supported by
special (often distortionary) relationships and with trade
between these blocs being regulated to a considerable degree.
As I have suggested elsewhere (Baldwin, 1985), another
strategy that might prevent this outcome is to channel the
dissatisfaction of the United States and other countries with the
present regime into a multilateral negotiation that deals
directly with the sources of this dissatisfaction.This would
involve a comprehensive negotiation covering subsidies and other
unfair practices, such as those dealing with technical barriers
to trade and government procurement policies, that would be
conducted in a manner similar to the item-by-item technique
formerly used in tariff negotiations and in the determination of
items to be covered by the government procurement code.In the
crucial area of subsidies, the objective would be to phase out
particular subsidies gradually, bind their level for specified
periods of time, or perhaps introduce export taxes (where
permitted) to offset the export—subsidizing element in domestic
subsidies. The incentives for a country to engage in such
negotiations would be 1) the prospect of reductions in others'
subsidies in return for its willingness to reduce its own
subsidies, and 2) the threat that others will carry out the
countervailing duty actions permitted by GATT rules.
Each country would undertake a comprehensive evaluation of
29all the subsidizing and other unfair practices of other countries
that it believes are causing material injury to any of its
industries, seriously prejudicing its interests, or nullifying or
impairing its GATT benefits.Each participant would then make
specific requests of other countries on the reduction or offset
of these practices.At the same time, each would announce the
countervailing duty and other actions it was prepared to initiate
if bilateral or multilateral negotiations were not successful.
If past experience is any guide, most countries would be willing
to enter into serious negotiations given the possibility that
many other countries may impose countervailing duties or other
restrictive actions against their exports.
The negotiations would begin with the "confrontation and
justification" procedure used in the Kennedy Round for claiming
exceptions to the 50 percent linear—cut rule.Countries that
thought, for example, that a particular subsidy by another
participant was inconsistent with GATT rules would present their
evidence in a GATT meeting.The subsidizing country would be
asked to explain the purpose of the subsidy, any government plans
to phase it out or modify it, and why it believed the subsidy was
consistent with the rules. After any changes in request lists or
plans for retaliation resulting from the confrontation and
justification procedure, the negotiating process would begin with
an exchange of offer lists specifying what,if anything,
countries were willing to do to phase out particular subsidies,
bind other subsidies, impose export taxes to offset their injury—
30(:ausing effects, or take other appropriate action to respond to
the concerns of other participants.At this stage either a
"confronter' or "justifier on a particular subsidy could also
call for the formation of a GATT panel of experts to render a
non—binding decision on whether the subsidy was consistent with
GATT rules.
The negotiation would then proceed on both a multilateral
and bilateral basis with any participant having the right to
request a meeting with other participants to discuss a particular
subsidy or other allegedly unfair trade practice. In some
instances, several countries would meet with a particular country
to seek its agreement to phase out, reduce, or otherwise modify
an allegedly unfair practice to meet the concerns of the others.
Inothercircumstances,bilateral meetings may be more
appropriate, even if the impact of the practice extends to more
than one country. The GATT Secretariat would play an active role
in coordinating the negotiation and ensuring that all promising
lines of agreement were explored.
After these negotiations, each country would decide the
extent to which it was prepared to (1) modify its subsidizing and
other allegedly unfair practices and (2) proceed with counter-
vailing duty and other retaliatory actions against other
countries and particular practices.For example, even if two
countries believed their subsidies on certain products were
consistent with GATT rules, they may each be willing to phase out
their subsidy in return for the phasing out of the subsidy by the
31nther country. For the United States, any such agreements
reached would be submitted by the President to the Congress for
approval and would include the necessary domestic implementing
legislation. Industries covered by the agreements would be
precluded from seeking countervailing duties during the time
period covered by the agreements, just as industries covered by
the reciprocal tariff agreements negotiated in the 1930s were not
subject to the provisions of the 1930 Tariff Act that required
the President to set tariffs that equalized the cost of
production of U.S. and foreign producers.The escape clause
provisions of Article XIX would still apply, however. When
countervailing duties are imposed, they would be presented as
technical adjustments consistent with GATT rules rather than as
political actions involving matters of national pride.
A greater consensus on the proper role of subsidies may
emerge from the negotiating process that would lead to modifica-
tions in the Subsidies Code.In particular, there seems to be a
need to better distinguish between domestic subsidies of the
beggar-thy-neighbor type and those that contribute to the
efficient growth of the world economy or can be justified for
export—oriented industries on the same adjustment grounds as
protection introduced for import—competing industries under
Article XIX. Temporary and degressive subsidies should be
considered for export—oriented industries that are seriously
injured by export competition in third markets. A more difficult
problem is distinguishing between subsidies justifiable from an
32economic viewpoint on infant-industry grounds and those aimed
simply at shifting market shares at the expense of collective
income in the trading community.Most trade officials would
require that any permissible subsidies in this group be
temporary, degressive, and carefully monitored by the GATT
Subsidies Committee.The negotiations may also lead to improve-
ments in the Standards and Government Procurement Codes and to
agreement on a new Safeguards Code strengthening Article XIX.
In conclusion, there are several reasons for considering a
GATT—sponsored negotiation on subsidies and other unfair trade
practices.Most important, such a negotiation could channel the
present dissatisfaction of most countries with the existing
trading regime in a constructive direction that leads to multi-
lateral efforts to reform the system and away from the
destructive, go-it--alone direction in which many countries seem
to be headed. The United States would at last get the
opportunity to deal directly and comprehensively with the
fundamental issue that is of most concern to many officials.
Executive branch officials are continually bombarded with
complaints from members of Congress and the business and labor
communities about the unfair trade practices of other countries
but, inmanyinstances, have a difficult time coming up with
specifics that permit actions under GATT rules. They would be
able to deal with these pressures in a systematic fashion in such
a negotiation.
Japan and the European Community, who believe that most of
33the complaints by other countries are unfounded, would be able to
confront the complainants before the international trading
community and force them to come up with substantive objections
instead of vague rhetoric. The power of the other members of the
GATT to force both the U.S. and the EC to modify what these other
countries regarded as unacceptably selfish positions was clearly
demonstrated in the Tokyo Round negotiations on the tariff-
reducing rule. The developing countries and the smaller
industrial countries should welcome such a negotiation since it
will give them an opportunity to band together as a group to try
to modify certain market—contracting subsidizing practices of the
large trading powers.The increasing use of bilateral negotia-
tions by the large trading blocs has put the developing countries
in a very weak negotiating position.As a group, they will be
better able to defend their own subsidizing practices.
There are, however, significant risks in undertaking a
negotiation on subsidies and other unfair trade practices.
Failure to reach agreements that meet the main concerns of the
participants on the fairness issue could touch off a series of
countervailing and retaliatory actions that produce a trading
regime less satisfactory to all than the present one. The
possibility of this outcome should be weighed not only against
the chances for a successful negotiation but against the
prospects for the trading system if no such action is taken.
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